State v. Marshall
The defendant was accused of the murder of his wife and conspiracy to commit murder. He appealed to the Court of appeal and the Supreme Court, where the conviction was upheld. The defendant’s recourse was to move the court for a Post-Conviction Relief (PCR), whereby he claimed, among other grounds, that there were irregularities in the conviction of guilt. The court dismissed whereby the defendant again moved to the Supreme Court with more grounds totaling about 500 claims under the PCR. One of the main allegations that the defendant was alleging was that the prosecution did not make available all the documents which had been used to convict him, thereby breached the Amendments to the Constitution. The defendant’s claim, therefore, was for the court to compel the evidence and documents relied upon. The prosecution made the discoveries of some of the documents claimed. Thus, the defendant’s sought for the case to be dismissed in totality for lack of discovery on the part of the prosecution. The court in giving its decision held that the PCR process is not an alternative for the appeal process. Therefore, the defendant cannot seek to burden the court with all sorts of claims which are lacking in merit to prevent the conviction that was upheld in the same court.
People v. Goetz
In this case, the accused was charged with attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon. He was indicted for all other charges apart for one of unlawful possession of a weapon. The People sought a second grand jury, which held several counts of all charges, as stated above. The accused moved the court to dismiss as the prosecution had directed the second jury to undertake an objective test to the use of a weapon by identifying whether his actions were that of a reasonable man. The court held that the prosecution had erroneously instructed the jury to undertake the objective test instead of the subjective test, which should focus on the state of mind of the user of a deadly weapon (Watchler, CJ). The court of appeal, however, ruled that the law has not always required the belief to inflict serious injury be correct for the use of deadly force to be justified, the provisions required that the belief be an objective notion of reasonableness (Law School Case Brief).
State v. Norman
The accused person killed her husband while he was sleeping, and her defense was that she had killed him in self-defense. The accused had revealed to the court that the deceased had been beating her and making her go without food for days. There were also mistreatments of all kinds, such as forcing her to prostitute herself so that they can get the money (State v. Norman). Upon evidence gi to court be expert witnesses, they claimed that the accused suffered from battered spouse syndrome and believed that her spouse would kill her one day. The court, however, held that at the time the accused killed her husband, she was not under any imminent danger and, therefore, could not claim self-defense. Thus, the court held that this was not a case of perfect self-defense as the deceased was asleep while he was killed, and the mere fact that that person may hurt you is not a defense (Law School Case Brief).
United States v. Peterson
The defendant, Peterson, was in his house when he found Keitt trying to steal his car. He tried to tell the perpetrator to back off, to which Keitt refused. The defendant went back inside the house and collected a gun to which he found Keitt trying to get away with his car. An argument ensued where Keitt, who was holding a metal bar, tried to intimidate Peterson but did not approach him. The defendant went ahead and shot Keitt and killing him. Upon the matter coming to court, the court, upon hearing the evidence ruled that Peterson could not plead self-defense as he had instigated and accelerated the fight where he retrieved the gun and shot the other man (United States v. Peterson). The court further held that where the aggressor starts the fight but retreats where an opportunity is present, then that person can be allowed to plead self-defense. Still, the defense of self-defense is unavailable to an aggressor, and the no-retreat rule, if attacked at home, was available only to those who were without fault in causing the conflict (Law School Case Brief).
People v. Ceballos
The defendant lived by himself above a garage, which was used to house his items. He testified that one day, he found claw marks under his garage door where someone had tried to break in. He further testified that he set up a trap gun, which would automatically shoot once the garage door was opened. Two 16-year-old boys came back to the defendant’s property, where one of them testified that they had come with the intent to steal some things for resale (People v. Ceballos). One of them broke the lock and opened the door upon which he triggered the trap gun shooting him in the head. The defendant was charged with murder. However, in his defense, he claimed that he had a right to shoot as trespassers had entered his property with the intent to steal. The court in rejecting this stated that the use of force must be justifiable to the circumstances. The defendant was in no imminent danger as the boys had not carried any weapons. Hence the use of instruments was unlawful as they could not give any warning to the other party and would further hinder other parties such as policemen from undertaking their duties (Law School Case Brief).
Tennessee v. Garner
Garner brought a civil case against the police department and one of its officers, Hyman, who had shot Garner’s son after he refused to heed lawful orders to stop. The deceased was suspected of having robbed a house to which the officers were called. After he refused to stop, officer Hyman shot him with a hollow bullet to the head where he died a few days later (Tennessee v. Garner). The court of the first instance held that the officer was undertaking lawful orders under the Tennessee Penal law, which authorized police officers to use any means necessary to prevent the escape of a criminal. Upon appeal, the court reversed the decision by holding that the Tennessee law violated the 4th Amendment to the Constitution since by shooting the boy, the officer had already undertaken seizure (TENNESSEE v. GARNER (1985)). The court further determined that the deceased did not have a weapon on him, and therefore, the use of deadly force by the officer constituted excessive force.
Commonwealth v. Kendall
The issue, in this case, was whether the defense of necessity could be sustained where the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The defendant testified that they had been drinking with his girlfriend when upon getting home, he stumbled knocking into his girlfriend, who, as a result, hit her head on the corner of the table and started bleeding profusely. The court rejected this defense and held that the defendant could not justify this defense as they were in a populated area, which included a fire station within 100 yards of the defendant’s house. The defendant sought a review on the account that the judge had erred in refusing his counsel to instruct the jury on the OUI and to present a defense of necessity (Commonwealth v. Kendall). The court in upholding the decision of the district court held that this defense was one that would exonerate a person where the harm resulted from the compliance of the law outweighs the damage resulting from the defendant’s violation of the law. The court further stated that the defendant would be allowed to instruct the jury if they had presented enough evidence to warrant the case for the defense of necessity (Commonwealth v. Clinton Kendall).
State v. Dejarlais
In this case, the defendant had a protection order against him. The law had been taken out by his girlfriend. It had initially been applied for and taken since the lady was undergoing a divorce. A parenting order was in force, and the lady did not want to jeopardize it. According to the testimony given in court, the affair continued even after the protection order came into force. Sometime after, the defendant went to jail for an unrelated offense, and upon leaving prison, came to visit the lady by accessing the house through an unlocked door. An argument ensued, and the defendant had intercourse with the lady despite her protestations. The defendant was charged with third-degree rape and violation of a protection order. In his defense, the defendant stated that the intercourse had been consensual, and the defendant was invited to the house. The judge further rejected an application by counsel for the defendant to instruct the jury that if the person protected by a Protection Order expressly invited or solicited the presence of the defendant, then the defendant is not guilty of Violation of Protection Order (State v. Dejarlais). The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant was granted a review, and the court upheld the decision rendered holding that a person commits the crime of violation of an order for protection when that person knowingly violates the terms of the protection order.
Moler v. State
Moler was charged and convicted of murder for having murdered an elderly relative of the people he was living with at the time of the killing. It is his defense that he had Schizophrenia, and the people living with him knew of his condition. The defendant appealed this conviction and argued that he was insane at the time of committing the act, and the state did not proffer any evidence to invalidate this. The defendant stated that two expert witnesses were called to the stand, and both found that the defendant was insane and could not have understood what he was doing at the time. The court in upholding the decision stated that a jury might infer the state of the defendant from lay witnesses who claimed that the defendant was quite reasonable after the act and that we were able to relate the events that led to the death and the story remained consisted throughout (Moler v. State).
Brancaccio v. State
The defendant was a minor who had been charged and convicted of first-degree murder. He confessed to the crime, and before undertaking the confession, he was read his Miranda warnings and was made to understand the impact of his confession. It is in the court record that the Appellant had asked whether his mother had been called before him giving the testimony (Brancaccio v. State). The Appellant appealed on condition that the judge erred in admitting into evidence a confession given by the minor in the absence of the parents. This was even after he had explicitly asked if they were called. The appellate court held that the police had read adequately to the Appellant his Miranda warnings, and he had indicated that he had understood. The court further stated that the Appellant had waived his rights and, therefore, could not then appeal on the same principle.
Besides, the Appellant’s age and state of mind were that the Appellant would have been said to have understood the purport of the Miranda warnings (Carter, 273). The fact that he had asked if his mother had been called could not be said to have constituted an issue to have the confession disallowed.
Brazill v. State
In this case, the defendant was charged and indicted with the charge of first-degree murder for killing his teacher. At the time of the murder, Brazill was 13 years of age. According to the Florida Statutes, a minor accused of murder and where the charge is proved, then the minor, regardless of his age, shall be tried as an adult (Brazill v. State). The defendant claimed that this particular section was unconstitutional and denied the defendant due process of the law.
The court in determining the issues raised by the defendant stated that on the point that the defendant was denied the due process by being tried as an adult, there was no law explicitly requiring juveniles to be treated in a special court, and therefore this assertion was rejected. Further, he stated that the Florida constitution had defined who a child is, and the Florida Statutes were in violation since they were in contravention of the Florida Constitution (Lippman, 296). The court in reaching its decision stated that the indictment and sentencing were lawful as it fell under the statutory limits provided by the court.
State v. Ramer
The defendant was charged and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and of having a stabbing knife. The defendant, upon conviction, applied for a review on the basis that the switchblade in question was defined in Webster’s Third new international dictionary that defined the switchblade as a type of a pocket knife. The defendant, therefore, contended that upon this definition and per ORS 166.240, the defendant had not committed the crime as he was lawfully carrying a weapon that is allowed under that provision (State v. Ramer).
The court agreed with the defendant on the first count and reversed. However, on the second count, the court found that the defendant violated ORS 166.510. The provision provided that carrying, manufacturing, and possession of a pocket knife, which was a knife having the blade spring operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open was a Class A misdemeanor (Lippman, 104). The court refused the defendant’s contention that the conviction b reversed since there was no error shown by the defendant. Additionally, the provision only required proof of possession, and therefore, the sentence on the second count was upheld.
Whitworth v. State
The Appellant was indicted and charged with a felony aggravated possession of marijuana greater than fifty pounds but less than two hundred pounds, where he pleaded not guilty. The court of the first instance held that the Appellant was guilty of the charge since he had the key to the boot where the marijuana was. Two security guards testified that they had observed a vehicle that was parked on the parking of Marriott hotel, where the boot of the car was partially opened. Upon investigation, they discovered that there was a strong scent of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Later, the police officers who had been deployed to the hotel to provide security for prom were called. The police officers opened the vehicle and found rolls of bhang (Whitworth v. State). They closed the boot of the car but decided to observe the vehicle. After a while, two individuals came, and Whitworth opened the boot of the car and placed a bag inside. It was during this time that they were both arrested.
The Appellant appealed against the conviction because the conviction was obtained through circumstantial evidence that did not link the Appellant to the subject vehicle. The vehicle was a rental and was rented to Finley, but the court was never made aware of the relationship between him and Whitworth. The court held that for a person to be convicted of possession of a controlled substance, then it must be proved that it was in his possession, control, or management and that he knew that the material in question was a controlled substance. It was found that the conviction was justified as the case had met the two requirements needed to prove possession of a controlled substance.
Miller v. State
The Appellant was charged and convicted with the murder of three persons and was put on death row. The Appellant sought for a post-conviction relief, which was denied, thereby necessitating the appeal. The jury had recommended that the Appellant be sentenced to death, which the court confirmed recommendation. The Appellant appealed in the Supreme Court of the state, and the United States Supreme court, but the appeals were rejected. Miller filed rule 32 timely petition seeking that he had had ineffective counsel at trial and during the first appeals (Miller v. State). The court stated that a post-conviction relief was not a creature that is often found in criminal cases as it is only restricted to civil cases. The court further noted that the appeal was preferred due to plain errors on representation.
The post-conviction reliefs are not preferred where the grounds for appeal are errors such as those for representation. The Appellant also faulted the circuit court for not adopting the order under rule 32 and asserts that the court violated his due process rights in denying him the request. The court found that the evidence given during the hearing was that counsels for the Appellant were vigilant in representing him. Taking into account that the appellate counsel even investigated the allegation of the former counsel not effectively representing him and, therefore, could not have been said not to have represented his client to his full ability. The court thus found that the Appellant had not demonstrated sufficiently and that he had failed to show the court that the conduct of his counsels was so unreasonable as to render his defense and claim null.
State v. Ramirez
The issue, in this case, was whether the defendant had premeditated the murder of another person. The facts of the case are that the defendant, Ramirez, had been involved in an altercation with another person named David. The fight happened when David visited Ramirez’s girlfriend while Ramirez was present. Ramirez pulled a gun and threatened to kill David. The following day Ramirez saw David’s brother, who looked like David and after greeting him, pulled a gun and shot him in the head twice. During the trial, the defendant asserted that he had not premeditated the murder of David’s brother, and this was done on impulse. The court determining this issue stated that premeditation need not have happened over a long or drawn-out period that it could be done within a split second (State v. Ramirez). The reason for the issuance of Ramirez insisting that there had been no premeditation before the killing was because the intent is usually the difference between first-degree and second-degree murder.
The court further provided that the crime of murder had two elements that of acting or the action undertaken and the state of mind of the person committing the act. In this case, however, the court held that the split second that it took the defendant to think about what he was doing and to want the person dead was what presented the element of premeditation.
State v. Davis
The defendant had been charged and convicted with first-degree murder of a 12-year-old girl. The defendant claimed that there was prosecutorial misconduct in how his case was conducted. During the pre-trial hearing of the case, the prosecutor had alluded to a crime committed by the defendant of stealing firearms from an animal shelter, which the prosecutor asked the police officer whether they had asked him about that crime. At the time of raising this issue, the jury was not in court. The defendant objected to the line of questioning, and the prosecutor apologized and refrained from alluding to the same. It is to be noted that the defendant also had a past criminal history where it was discovered upon investigation that the defendant was arrested on charges of assault against another.
The court, however, in its pre-trial ruling, had excluded that evidence from being used in court. The defendant, therefore, stated that the use and reference of this evidence in court hurt his case, which resulted in the conviction of guilty and a sentence of death. The court, however, provided that mere reference of that evidence did not amount to proof that compromised the defendant’s case. This is provided for under the U.S Constitution that the misconduct of a prosecutor that infects the whole matter, results in the denial of due process. This had not been reached, and therefore, the conviction was upheld.
State v. Forrest
In this case, the defendant was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for having hired another to kill his brother-in-law. The defendant in objecting to this conviction raised several assignments, most important of which provided that the statute at the time provided for first-degree murder and the evidence presented in court did not reach that which can be considered first-degree murder. The state claimed that the defendant had, at the very least, aided and abetted in the murder by paying another person for the death of his brother-in-law. Therefore a conviction of first-degree murder was justified. The court in reviewing the evidence before it asserted that the defendant had driven Bezar, the assassin, and passed the gun that killed the victim over to Bezar. The court in considering this evidence stated that this was not aiding and abetting the statute had excluded that. The court, therefore, found that assignment to be unmerited.
The defendant brought out another issue in another assignment, where he stated that evidence that was supposed to have been struck out was admitted by the judge erroneously. This evidence involved the callous treatment of his dead wife. The court allowed two witnesses to testify to that effect something which the defendant stated was to his detriment. The court in this issue found that the evidence tendered even though irritant did not mean that it was prejudicial to the defendant and his case as to have denied him due process and justice. The court upheld the conviction.
Owen v. State
The Appellant had been indicted by a grand jury on murder in the first degree for killing Grady with malice aforethought and unlawfully, with a gun and killing him. The Appellant’s counsel appealed on behalf of his client by stating that the incitement of the Appellant was not recorded, and it was not taken in court. The court reviewed the record of the trial court assertively indicated that the indictment was appropriately made. The defendant, after that, applied for a motion to quash the charge since the prosecution had been taken under an order of the court to form the Grand Jury, where no warrants or any provisions of the law provides the same.
Further, the defendant stated that there was no lawful order that reconstituted or discharged the activities and mandate of that Grand Jury. Also, one of the jurors was challenged for the fact that there was an affinity with the defendant. The court in replying to this challenge stated that the juror was not subject to being challenged as he was not within the fifth degree of kinship, and therefore, this challenge could not be upheld. The court, however, indicated that there should be no bias to a trial, and the defendant must not feel biased in this case. Also, the possibility that there may occur any bias, whether real or imagined, should be adequately addressed. It is on this basis that the judge ordered a rehearing.
Midgett v. State
The Appellant had presented the appeal based on his sentencing. According to the Arkansas law, the maximum imprisonment for cases of first-degree murder was held to be 40 years and a minimum of 10 years for a lesser felony. The court provides that since first-degree murder is a class Y felony, then it attracts a maximum sentence of 40 years. The Appellant had requested rehearing so that the jury could rehear the case and provide for second-degree murder. The court rejected this argument by stating that no evidence was proffered to show that the defendant had been sentenced excessively than the law provides.
In holding this position, the court provided that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed that particular crime. On the other hand, where there is not enough evidence to indict on that specific offense, then a lesser charge which was sufficiently proved and which was provided for in the indictment charge must be preferred. The lesser charge must have been provided for in the charge information as it is against due process and administration of justice to charge one for a crime which was not initiated in the information and for which he has not adequately prepared his defense. Therefore, the court found that the trial court had duly and lawfully reached this verdict, and it was therefore upheld.
State v. Davidson
The defendant was charged with second-degree murder for the killing of an 11-year-old boy by her Rottweiler dogs. The case was that the Appellant failed to confine her dogs, which killed the victim. She was charged with reckless second-degree murder and endangerment of a child. The Appellant on appeal provided that the second-degree murder was not consistent with her conduct, and the charge should be lessened to voluntary manslaughter as her failure was in negligently failing to confine her dogs. The court heard a multitude of evidence against Davidson and his dogs. Multiple witnesses testified having been chased away by the dogs or the dogs expressing and being a threat to them such that they were afraid for their lives. Several neighbors of the defendant testified that the dogs would often be seen out of their closure, and when the Davidsons were informed of this, they would be blasé about it. The witnesses testified that the sheriff had been called in a few times, especially on one occasion when a neighbor observed four dogs converging on two children. He stated that he called the sheriff in addition to taking his gun so that he could save the children. The court observed that the conduct of the Appellant was not only negligent but was so reckless as to have caused the death of the victim. The court held that the trial court had made an adequate ruling and conviction as the behavior of the Appellant was such that there was reckless regard for human life where his dogs were concerned. She did not take reasonable steps to ensure that the dogs were steps to ensure that the dogs did not attack other members of the community. The conviction was, therefore, upheld.
People v. Lowery
The defendant, Antonio Lowery, faced charges of first-degree murder, two counts of armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery at the circuit court of Cook County based on the commission of a felony. The trial court convicted the defendant of all three charges. He was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree murder, 20 years for each count of armed robbery, and 12 years for the attempted robbery. All the sentences were to be served concurrently. Upon appealing the ruling, the appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction overturning the felony murder sentence. The appellate court reversed the verdict on the grounds of insufficient evidence supporting the charges. Following this ruling, the PEOPLE of the State of Illinois moved to the Supreme Court to appeal the reversal of the Appellate court. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the Appellate court for further consideration of the defendant’s remaining issues (People v. Lowery). At the heart of this case was the interpretation of the felony-murder doctrine as stipulated within section 9-1(a)(3) of the criminal code. It was vital to determine whether the felony-murder provision applies to a case where it is the victim of a felony incident, rather than the defendant or his accomplice, who fires a fatal shot that kills an innocent bystander (Aviram). Using the proximate cause theory of the felony-murder doctrine alongside the principle outlined in Payne and Hickman, the defendant’s criminal acts set into motion a chain of events leading to the decedent’s death.
State v. Richard Knutson, Inc.
In this case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was equally divided on whether to affirm or reverse the ruling of the circuit court for Waukesha county. Chief Justice Heffernan, Justice Geske, and Justice Steinmetz supported the reversal of the sentence. Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bablitch, and Justice Day supported affirmation. Justice Wilcox did not participate in the voting. Under such circumstances of a tie vote, the Supreme Court vacated the decision to certify and remanded the case to the court of appeals. The Supreme Court’s course of action overrules the precedents of Wisconsin Pub Power Inc. Sys v. Thompson (1993). The petition brought before the supreme court follows a complete review and opinion by the Appellate court, which is useful to both parties in case of a tie vote at the supreme court and the subsequent remand (State v. Richard Knutson, Inc).
On the other hand, the parties would be denied a full appellate review and opinion if the supreme court was to allow the circuit court sentence to stand. The approach to send the case back to the court of appeal for consideration is both reasonable and supported by court precedent (Harbour and Johnson, 267). The Wisconsin law provides that a corporation can be held criminally liable for the conduct of the individual employees or agents occurring within the line or scope of the employees while the management executives supervising the operation or process failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the commission of the crime.
Girouard v. State
Girouard v. state brought before the Court of Appeals of Maryland raised essential questions on the nature of provocation that should be deemed sufficient to mitigate a case from murder to manslaughter. For instance, the Appellate court was challenged to reconsider whether sufficient types of provocation must be within the scope of the conventional and recognized categories. Moreover, the court also sought to establish the basis for determining the sufficiency of the provocation. More specifically, the court had to decide whether verbal abuse alone should warrant manslaughter conviction rather than second-degree murder. The defendant, Steven, was inflamed by a distressing verbal attack from his wife, Joyce, on the night of the crime (Girouard v. State), The victim directed several insults at the defendant, even claiming that their marriage had been a mistake and that she wanted a divorce. Enraged by his wife’s mean comments, the defendant stabbed the victim to death. An expert witness at the trial, a psychologist, argued that Steven was pushed beyond his limits and that the circumstances of the crime were consistent with his personality. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County convicted the defendant to second-degree murder and sentenced him to 22 years’ imprisonment. During the appeal, the state countered that the common law has evolved to a point where even “conceding” provocative acts are no longer deemed reasonable and adequate for mitigating murder to manslaughter (Graham and Adamson, 533). The Appellate court concluded that the nature of provocation, in this case, was not sufficient to cause a prudent man to stab his wife 19 times.
People v. Mehserle
The defendant, in this case, was a police officer in the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, who shot and killed an unarmed passenger during a tense confrontation. The defendant claimed that he accidentally removed his gun and shot the victim. He had planned to use his Taser to incapacitate the passenger before arresting him. The trial convicted the defendant neither of murder nor voluntary manslaughter. Instead, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to two years in prison. The trial court deemed the shooting as a result of criminal negligence rather than accidental. Later the defendant appealed the decision citing new evidence, denial of probation, and the failure of the court to grant a new trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conclusion of the trial court (People v. Mehserle). For one, the appellate court reasoned that the distinction and placement of the two weapons made it difficult to mistake one for the other. For instance, the Taser weighs three times lighter than the handgun. Besides, the Taser has a manual safety switch and a laser, unlike the gun. Video surveillance and witness accounts at the BART demonstrate excessive use of force by the defendant and his fellow officers on the victim before the shooting occurred (Curran., Atlantic OccuPsych, and Thomas). Cell phone footage shows the victim tugging at his gun on three separate attempts before pulling it out and delivering the fatal shot. After reviewing different factors surrounding the shooting, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and therefore affirmed its conviction.
Aviram, Hadar. “Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends.” Available at SSRN 3404276 (2019).
Brancaccio v. State, 773 So. 2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, Nov 22, 2000, https://casetext.com/case/brancaccio-v-state-2
Brazill v. State, 845 So.2d 282 (2003), District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, May 14, 2003, https://www.leagle.com/decision/20031127845so2d28211072
Carter, Edward C. Criminal Law and Procedure for the Paralegal, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business (2019): 273-275.
Commonwealth v. Clinton Kendall. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, Decided: March 28, 2008, https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ma-supreme-judicial-court/1176372.html
Commonwealth v. Kendall. 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1102 (2007), No. 06-P-1569, https://www.leagle.com/decision/2007117169massappct1102111044
Curran, Stephen F., Atlantic OccuPsych, and Jamaal W. Thomas. “Videotaping and police behavior.” AELE Monthly (2011). Top of Form
Farahany, Nita A. “Neuroscience and behavioral genetics in U.S. criminal law: an empirical analysis.” Journal of Law and the Biosciences 2.3 (2016): 485-509.
Girouard v. state, 583 A. 2d 718 – Md: Court of Appeals 1991
Graham, Mark, and Bryan Adamson. “Law Students’ Undergraduate Major: Implications for Law School Academic Support Programs (ASPs).” UMKC L. Rev. 69 (2000): 533.
Harbour, Laurel J., and Natalya Y. Johnson. “Can a Corporation Commit Manslaughter-Recent Developments in the United Kingdom and the United States.” Def. Counsel J. 73 (2006): 226.
Law School Case Brief, People v. Ceballos – 12 Cal. 3d 470, 116 Cal. Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241 (1974) https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-people-v-ceballos
Law School Case Brief, People v. Goetz – 68 N.Y.2d 96, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-people-v-goetz
Law School Case Brief, State v. Norman – 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989) https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-state-v-norman
Law School Case Brief, United States v. Peterson – 157 U.S. App. D.C. 219, 483 F.2d 1222 (1973) https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-united-states-v-peterson
Lippmann, Matthew. Contemporary Criminal Law: Concepts, Cases, and Controversies, SAGE, 2009, 293-300.
Moler v. State, 494 P.2d 1250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Mar 1, 1972, https://casetext.com/case/moler-v-state
People v. Davis, 128 Misc. 2d 782 (N.Y. Misc. 1985), Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings County, May 31, 1985, https://casetext.com/case/people-v-davis-1118
People v. Ceballos, [Crim. No. 17136. Supreme Court of California. September 16, 1974.] https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/470.html
People v. Lowery, 687 NE 2d 973 – Ill: Supreme Court 1997
People v. Mehserle, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1125 – Cal: Court of Appeal, 1st Appellate Dist., 1st Div. 2012
Scheb, John I and Scheb, John II, Criminal Law and Procedure, Cengage Learning, 2013, 398-413.
State v. Norman, Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 366 S.E.2d 586 (1988) https://www.quimbee.com/cases/state-v-norman
State v. Ramer, 65 Or. App. 480 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) Oregon Court of Appeals, Nov 9, 1983, https://caselaw.findlaw.com/wa-supreme-court/1039973.html
State v. Ramirez. 945 P.2d 376 (1997), Arizona Court of Appeals, https://www.quimbee.com/cases/state-v-ramirez
State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 528 NW 2d 430 – Wis: Supreme Court 1995
Tennessee v. Garner, Facts of the case, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1035
The People of the State of New York v. Bernhard Goetz Goetz, Opinion of the Court, https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/archives/p_goetz.htm
The State of Washington, v. Steven Daniel Dejarlais, 944 P.2d 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1224058/state-v-dejarlais/
United States Supreme Court. TENNESSEE v. GARNER (1985) No. 83-1035 https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/471/1.html
United States v. Peterson, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 483 F.2d 1222 (1973) https://www.quimbee.com/cases/united-states-v-peterson–2#
Whitworth v. State. 808 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App. 1991) Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin, Apr 17, 1991, https://casetext.com/case/whitworth-v-state-1