Clausewitz famously offered the thesis that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means.” (42) One can certainly add to this statement, without betraying or distorting the spirit of Clausewitz’s remark, that threats and rumors of war are also a part of this “policy by other means.” In the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, such policy takes the form of on the one hand, continued actual physical buildup of weapons of mass destruction, and, on the other hand, the threat to use these weapons against nations viewed as hostile to the DPRK, most particularly, South Korea and the United States. Whereas this has been a traditional policy approach of North Korea, exemplified by Kim-Jong Il, the assent of his son to the top leadership position in the DPRK has not seen a shift in this strategy, but arguably its radicalization. This is evidenced by recent developments such as the testing of the Kwangmyongsong-3 Unit 2 satellite and on 12 February 2013, North Korean officials declared that they had undertaken an underground nuclear test. (Hounshell) This is accompanied by continued aggressive discourse from official DPRK sources. Arguably, however, this current crisis is a continuation of previous diplomatic disputes and international hostilities between DPRK and South Korea and the United States. In other words, the fact that such a form of policy approach by the DPRK has continued for this long a period suggests that the U.S.’s foreign policy has failed to properly address the relations with DPRK: the DPRK grand strategy of relying on a military-tinged discourse and real military buildup in regards to the West has shown a failure of diplomacy of U.S. to shift the basic character of North Korean policy.